A Lewisian logic of causal counterfactuals
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Minds and Machines
Publication Date
3-1-2013
Volume
23
Issue
1
First Page
77
Last Page
93
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Keywords
Causal models, Causal reasoning, Conditional logic, Counterfactual, Intervention
Abstract
In the artificial intelligence literature a promising approach to counterfactual reasoning is to interpret counterfactual conditionals based on causal models. Different logics of such causal counterfactuals have been developed with respect to different classes of causal models. In this paper I characterize the class of causal models that are Lewisian in the sense that they validate the principles in Lewis’s well-known logic of counterfactuals. I then develop a system sound and complete with respect to this class. The resulting logic is the weakest logic of causal counterfactuals that respects Lewis’s principles, sits in between the logic developed by Galles and Pearl and the logic developed by Halpern, and stands to Galles and Pearl’s logic in the same fashion as Lewis’s stands to Stalnaker’s.
DOI
10.1007/s11023-011-9261-z
Print ISSN
09246495
E-ISSN
15728641
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2011 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
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Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Zhang, J. (2013). A Lewisian logic of causal counterfactuals. Minds and Machines, 23(1), 77-93. doi: 10.1007/s11023-011-9261-z