A peculiarity in pearl’s logic of interventionist counterfactuals
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Journal of Philosophical Logic
Publication Date
10-10-2013
Volume
42
Issue
5
First Page
783
Last Page
794
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Keywords
Causal model, Counterfactual logic, Counterfactual dependence, terventionism
Abstract
We examine a formal semantics for counterfactual conditionals due to Judea Pearl, which formalizes the interventionist interpretation of counterfactuals central to the interventionist accounts of causation and explanation. We show that a characteristic principle validated by Pearl’s semantics, known as the principle of reversibility, states a kind of irreversibility: counterfactual dependence (in David Lewis’s sense) between two distinct events is irreversible. Moreover, we show that Pearl’s semantics rules out only mutual counterfactual dependence, not cyclic dependence in general. This, we argue, suggests that Pearl’s logic is either too weak or too strong.
DOI
10.1007/s10992-012-9249-z
Print ISSN
00223611
E-ISSN
15730433
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2012 Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Zhang, J., Lam, W. Y., & Clercq, R. D. (2013). A peculiarity in pearl’s logic of interventionist counterfactuals. Journal of Philosophical Logic, 42(5), 783-794. doi: 10.1007/s10992-012-9249-z