Infrastructure, incumbency, and influence : China's high-profile global development
Start Date
13-4-2023 10:50 AM
End Date
13-4-2023 12:20 PM
Description
Why do donor and host country governments cooperate on expensive, risky infrastructure? I argue that high-profile infrastructure uniquely reinforces incumbency advantage in host countries and generates policy influence for donors. Overseas infrastructure generates significant risks for donors given its scale, complexity, and visibility relative to other development projects, and allocating infrastructure to experienced leaders helps mitigate uncertainty. High-profile infrastructure helps host country leaders consolidate power by acquiring national-level capital with both material and symbolic functions, and facilitates donors' pursuit of influence in return. Analyzing new evidence on Chinese development finance since 1949, I show that high-profile infrastructure flows to host countries with longer-tenured leaders, helps extend their tenures, and generates donor influence. Other types of projects do not follow the same patterns. Accompanying historical and contemporary case studies illustrate how donor and host governments use high-profile infrastructure to pursue their political goals. The findings contribute to research on the political economy of aid, Chinese development finance, and infrastructure in international relations.
Document Type
Presentation
Recommended Citation
Strange, A. (2023, April). Infrastructure, incumbency, and influence: China's high-profile global development. Presented at the International Symposium on Africa-China Relations in an Era of Uncertain Future. Lingnan University, Hong Kong.
Infrastructure, incumbency, and influence : China's high-profile global development
Why do donor and host country governments cooperate on expensive, risky infrastructure? I argue that high-profile infrastructure uniquely reinforces incumbency advantage in host countries and generates policy influence for donors. Overseas infrastructure generates significant risks for donors given its scale, complexity, and visibility relative to other development projects, and allocating infrastructure to experienced leaders helps mitigate uncertainty. High-profile infrastructure helps host country leaders consolidate power by acquiring national-level capital with both material and symbolic functions, and facilitates donors' pursuit of influence in return. Analyzing new evidence on Chinese development finance since 1949, I show that high-profile infrastructure flows to host countries with longer-tenured leaders, helps extend their tenures, and generates donor influence. Other types of projects do not follow the same patterns. Accompanying historical and contemporary case studies illustrate how donor and host governments use high-profile infrastructure to pursue their political goals. The findings contribute to research on the political economy of aid, Chinese development finance, and infrastructure in international relations.