Incentive and corruption in Chinese economic reform
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Journal of Policy Reform
Publication Date
1-1-2001
Volume
4
Issue
3
First Page
195
Last Page
206
Publisher
Harwood Academic Publishers imprint
Keywords
Incentives, corruption, economic reform, China, Communist party
Abstract
The paper argues that, given the legacy of Chinese communism and its political structure, corruption, together with the threat of punishment for corruption and the selective enforcement of the threat, serves as a method of compensation that both satisfies the political objectives of the Communist party and provides an effective inducement to local officials to promote economic reform.
DOI
10.1080/13841280108523419
Print ISSN
17487870
E-ISSN
17487889
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2001 Overseas Publishers Association.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Fan, C. S., & Grossman, H. I. (2001). Incentive and corruption in Chinese economic reform. Journal of Policy Reform, 4(3), 195-206. doi: 10.1080/13841280108523419