绿色采购下供应商的政策一致性
Alternative Title
Dynamic consistence of supplier's policy in green supply chain
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
上海交通大学学报 = Journal of Shanghai Jiaotong University
Publication Date
3-1-2004
Volume
38
Issue
3
First Page
463
Last Page
465
Keywords
动态博弈, 动态一致性, 重复博弈, 供应链, Dynamic consistence, Dynamic game, Repeated games, Supply chain
Abstract
以博弈理论为工具，构造了绿色供应链环境下供需双方的单阶段博弈和重复博弈模型。模型分析表明，在单阶段博弈中，受利润最大化驱使的供应商必定会提供非绿色原料，从而实现低效率的均衡。在重复博弈中，长期利益对供应商的机会主义行为有制约作用，只要贴现因子满足一定条件，供应商就有积极性遵守提供绿色原料的诺言，最终实现经济与环保的"双赢"。
The game theory was utilized and one-stage game model and repeated game model were constructed. The models’ results show that powered by the economy benefit, the supplier will supply non-green raw material in one-stage game. As a result, the low efficient equilibrium is realized. In order to improve the efficiency of equilibrium, it is feasible to transfer one-stage game into repeated games. The long-term economy benefit will restrict the supplier’s opportunistic behavior in repeated games. As long as the discount factor can satisfy some condition, the supplier will conform its promise to supply green raw material, and the win-win of economy and environment protection will be realized.
DOI
10.3321/j.issn:1006-2467.2004.03.034
Print ISSN
10062467
Funding Information
国家自然科学基金资助项目 (70172002)。 {70172002}
Publisher Statement
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
Chinese (Simplified)
Recommended Citation
陈杰、屠梅曾、孙大宁 (2004)。绿色采购下供应商的政策一致性。《上海交通大学学报》，38(3)，463-465。doi: 10.3321/j.issn:1006-2467.2004.03.034