Trade wars and the slump
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
European Review of Economic History
Publication Date
4-1-2007
Volume
11
Issue
1
First Page
73
Last Page
98
Abstract
Simulated optimum tariff policies to achieve plausible government targets show objective reasons for the failure of international trade cooperation during the Slump of 1929 to 1933. For the largest players, the US and UK, benefits from foreign cooperation were small or negative. France and Germany would have been the principal beneficiaries of international cooperative policies. Since cooperation on one issue, tariffs, was difficult, cooperation on many - through the cross-issue bargaining attempted at the 1933 London Conference- was well nigh impossible. Optimum coordination across policy instruments within one country, on the other hand, would have yielded high returns for policy. A corollary is that lack of internal coordination (poor domestic policies) was a more important cause of the Great Depression than failure to harmonise policies internationally.
DOI
10.1017/S1361491606001882
Print ISSN
13614916
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2007 Cambridge University Press. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Foreman-Peck, J., Hallett, A. H., & Ma, Y. (2007). Trade wars and the slump. European Review of Economic History, 11(1), 73-98. doi: 10.1017/S1361491606001882