Science is not always “self-correcting” : fact–value conflation and the study of intelligence
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Foundations of Science
Publication Date
8-1-2016
Volume
21
Issue
3
First Page
477
Last Page
492
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Keywords
Epistemology, Fact–value distinction, Intelligence research, Science and morality
Abstract
Some prominent scientists and philosophers have stated openly that moral and political considerations should influence whether we accept or promulgate scientific theories. This widespread view has significantly influenced the development, and public perception, of intelligence research. Theories related to group differences in intelligence are often rejected a priori on explicitly moral grounds. Thus the idea, frequently expressed by commentators on science, that science is “self-correcting”—that hypotheses are simply abandoned when they are undermined by empirical evidence—may not be correct in all contexts. In this paper, documentation spanning from the early 1970s to the present is collected, which reveals the influence of scientists’ moral and political commitments on the study of intelligence. It is suggested that misrepresenting findings in science to achieve desirable social goals will ultimately harm both science and society.
DOI
10.1007/s10699-015-9421-3
Print ISSN
12331821
E-ISSN
15728471
Funding Information
This work was supported by a fellowship from the Research Grants Council of Hong Kong.
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2015, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Cofnas, N. (2016). Science is not always “self-correcting”: Fact–value conflation and the study of intelligence. Foundations of Science, 21(3), 477-492. doi: 10.1007/s10699-015-9421-3