Extensive philosophical agreement and progress
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Metaphilosophy
Publication Date
1-1-2017
Volume
48
Issue
1-2
First Page
47
Last Page
57
Publisher
Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Keywords
agreement, disagreement, expertise, metaphilosophy, philosophical progress, scientific progress
Abstract
This article argues, first, that there is plenty of agreement among philosophers on philosophically substantive claims, which fall into three categories: reasons for or against certain views, elementary truths regarding fundamental notions, and highly conditionalized claims. This agreement suggests that there is important philosophical progress. It then argues that although it's easy to list several potential kinds of philosophical progress, it is much harder to determine whether the potential is actual. Then the article attempts to articulate the truth that the deniers of philosophical progress are latching on to. Finally, it comments on the significance of the agreement and (potential) progress.
DOI
10.1111/meta.12227
Print ISSN
00261068
E-ISSN
14679973
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2017 Metaphilosophy LLC and John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Frances, B. (2017). Extensive philosophical agreement and progress. Metaphilosophy, 48(1-2), 47-57. doi: 10.1111/meta.12227