Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics : a reply to Andow
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Philosophia : Philosophical Quarterly of Israel
Publication Date
6-1-2017
Volume
45
Issue
2
First Page
717
Last Page
734
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Keywords
Dispositions, Metasemantics, Philosophy of language
Abstract
In previous work (Johnson & Nado 2014) we proposed a sketch of a disposition-based metasemantictheory, which has recently been criticized by James Andow (2016). Andow claims, first, that our dispositionalmetasemantics threatens to render the meanings of our words indeterminate, and second, that our viewrisks a 'semantic apocalypse' according to which most of our terms fail to refer. We respond to Andow'scriticism by modifying and expanding our orignial, underspecified view. In particular, we propose that a viewthat appeals to actual dispositions rather than counterfactual dispositions avoids many difficulties that might confront a disposition-based metasemantics - issues even beyond those that Andow raises.
DOI
10.1007/s11406-017-9840-1
Print ISSN
00483893
E-ISSN
15749274
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2017, Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Johnson, M., & Nado, J. (2017). Actual vs. counterfactual dispositional metasemantics: A reply to Andow. Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel, 45(2), 717-734. doi: 10.1007/s11406-017-9840-1