Title
Managing careers in organizations
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Journal of Labor Economics
Publication Date
1-1-2018
Volume
36
Issue
1
First Page
197
Last Page
252
Publisher
University of Chicago Press
Abstract
Firms’ organizational structures impose constraints on their ability to usepromotion-basedincentives.Wedevelopa frameworkfor identifying these constraints and exploring their consequences.We show that firms manage workers’ careers by choosing personnel policies that resemble an internal labor market. Firms may adopt forced turnover policies to keep lines of advancement open, and they may alter their organizational structures to relax these constraints. This gives rise to a trade-off between incentive provision at the worker level and productive efficiency at the firm level. Our framework generates novel testable implications that connect firm-level characteristics with workers’ careers.
DOI
10.1086/693871
Print ISSN
0734306X
E-ISSN
15375307
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2017 by The University of Chicago. All rights reserved. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Ke, R., Li, J., & Powell, M. (2018). Managing careers in organizations. Journal of Labor Economics, 36(1), 197-252. doi: 10.1086/693871
