An explanatory challenge to moral reductionism
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Theoria
Publication Date
12-1-2012
Volume
78
Issue
4
First Page
309
Last Page
325
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing Ltd.
Keywords
depth, moral explanation, moral reductionism, unification
Abstract
It is generally believed that moral reductionism is immune from notorious problems in moral metaphysics and epistemology, such as the problem of moral explanation - it is at least on this dimension that moral reductionism scores better than moral anti-reductionism. However, in this article I reject this popular view. First, I argue that moral reductionism fails to help vindicate the explanatory efficacy of moral properties because the reductionist solution is either circular or otiose. Second, I attempt to show that a successful vindication, if any, of moral explanation requires moral-descriptive irreducibility. My discussion thus raises an explanatory challenge to moral reductionism.
DOI
10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01147.x
Print ISSN
00405825
E-ISSN
17552567
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2012 Stiftelsen Theoria. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Zhong, L. (2012). An explanatory challenge to moral reductionism. Theoria, 78(4), 309-325. doi: 10.1111/j.1755-2567.2012.01147.x