On rationally valuing one’s life
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Asian Bioethics Review
Publication Date
9-1-2016
Volume
8
Issue
3
First Page
244
Last Page
257
Publisher
NUS Press Pte. Ltd.
Keywords
Kant, Velleman, Nature of Autonomy Suicide, Self-Determination, Frankfurt School, Value of Human Life
Abstract
Human life has special importance. Human decisions must be granted special respect. It is natural to see these claims as connected. It seems likely that human life has value because human beings possess a unique capacity for self-determination. David Velleman’s argument that the nature of autonomy provides us with a prima facie case against the morally permissibility of suicide, at least in most cases, rests on highly questionable premises. Nonetheless, it does point to the importance of a proper understanding of seemingly arcane notions like the self and autonomy in giving principled and systematic answers to practical moral dilemmas. I will argue here that his case against suicide relies on a Kantian understanding of the nature of the self, and consequently of the nature of autonomy and how it should be respected.
DOI
10.1353/asb.2016.0020
Print ISSN
17938759
E-ISSN
17939453
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2016 The Author
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Baker, D. (2016). On rationally valuing one’s life. Asian Bioethics Review, 8(3), 244-257. doi: 10.1353/asb.2016.0020