Do party governments matter after all? Executive ideology, constitutional structures and their combined effect on welfare state change
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice
Publication Date
8-1-2010
Volume
12
Issue
4
First Page
395
Last Page
415
Publisher
Taylor & Francis
Abstract
This paper presents a series of innovative, pooled time-series, cross-section (TSCS) regression models for 18 OECD countries (1971–2001) to explore the impact of executive ideology alternation and constitutional structures on welfare state change. Unlike other approaches in comparative welfare state research, the models specified in this paper focus not on the content or direction, but on the extent of change. Interaction effects between executive ideology alternation and constitutional structures are emphasized. The paper suggests that the effect of party ideology is particularly strong in political systems that concentrate power in the executive. In these systems, ideological differences from one cabinet to another lead to considerable policy change. Contrarily, systems with considerable degrees of consensus-based policy making are not only characterized by lower levels of welfare state change, but ideological differences of successive cabinets are more likely to lead to policy gridlock.
DOI
10.1080/13876988.2010.495507
Print ISSN
13876988
E-ISSN
15725448
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2010 Taylor & Francis
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Kühner, S. (2010). Do party governments matter after all? Executive ideology, constitutional structures and their combined effect on welfare state change. Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis: Research and Practice, 12(4), 395-415. doi: 10.1080/13876988.2010.495507