Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Games and Economic Behavior
Publication Date
6-1-2011
Volume
72
Issue
2
First Page
574
Last Page
582
Publisher
Elsevier
Keywords
Nonparametric identification, auctions
Abstract
Within the IPV paradigm, we show nonparametric identification of model primitives for first-price and Dutch auctions with a binding reserve price and auction-specific, unobservable sets of potential bidders.
DOI
10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011
Print ISSN
08998256
E-ISSN
10902473
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2010 Elsevier Inc.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Shneyerov, A., & Wong, A. C. L. (2011). Identification in first-price and Dutch auctions when the number of potential bidders is unobservable. Games and Economic Behavior, 72(2), 574-582. doi: 10.1016/j.geb.2010.10.011