Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Economics Letters
Publication Date
7-1-2011
Volume
112
Issue
1
First Page
128
Last Page
131
Publisher
Elsevier
Keywords
Markets with search frictions, matching and bargaining, two-sided incomplete information
Abstract
We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016
Print ISSN
01651765
E-ISSN
18737374
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2011 Elsevier.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Shneyerov, A., & Wong, A. C. L. (2011). The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: Can it be good for efficiency? Economics Letters, 112(1), 128-131. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016