An analysis of intrinsicality
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Noûs
Publication Date
2-5-2015
Volume
50
Issue
4
First Page
704
Last Page
739
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Abstract
The leading account of intrinsicality over the last thirty years has arguably been David Lewis's account in terms of perfect naturalness. Lewis's account, however, has three serious problems: i) it cannot allow necessarily coextensive properties to differ in whether they are intrinsic; ii) it falsely classifies non-qualitative properties like being Obama as non-intrinsic; and iii) it is incompatible with a number of metaphysical theories that posit irreducibly non-categorical properties. I argue that, as a result of these problems, Lewis's account should be rejected and replaced with an alternative account, which also analyses intrinsicality in terms of perfect naturalness, but which avoids these problems.
DOI
10.1111/nous.12087
Print ISSN
00294624
E-ISSN
14680068
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2015 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Marshall, D. (2015). An analysis of intrinsicality. Noûs, 50(4), 704-739. doi: 10.1111/nous.12087