Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy
Publication Date
2014
Volume
8
First Page
1
Last Page
29
Abstract
A number of philosophers have offered quasi-perceptual theories of desire, according to which to desire something is roughly to “see” it as having value or providing reasons. These are offered as alternatives to the more traditional Humean Theory of Motivation, which denies that desires have a representational aspect. This paper examines the various considerations offered by advocates to motivate quasi-perceptualism. It argues that Humeanism is in fact able to explain the same data that the quasi-perceptualist can explain, and in one case the Humean explanation is superior. Quasi-perceptual accounts of desire, the paper concludes, are for the most part unmotivated.
E-ISSN
15593061
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2014 University of Southern California, Gould School of Law.
Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Baker, D. (2014). The abductive case for humeanism over quasi-perceptual theories of desire. Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy, 8, 1-29.