Kleptocracy and corruption
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Journal of Comparative Economics
Publication Date
3-1-2006
Volume
34
Issue
1
First Page
57
Last Page
74
Keywords
Corruption, Corruption deterrence, Kleptocracy, Rent-seeking competition
Abstract
In this paper, we develop a model that analyzes the competition and strategic interactions between a kleptocratic ruler and his officials in rent seeking. The ruler implements anti-corruption measures, which include wage incentives and monitoring, to discourage his opportunistic officials from seeking bribes to obtain more rent for himself. We show that the ruler pays an efficiency wage to his officials to eliminate corruption if and only if monitoring is relatively effective. We also demonstrate that, in a proprietary state, the ruler always sets an inefficiently high tax rate in order to discourage the officials from demanding bribes.
DOI
10.1016/j.jce.2005.11.001
Print ISSN
01475967
E-ISSN
10957227
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2005 Association for Comparative Economic Studies
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Fan, C. S. (2006). Kleptocracy and corruption. Journal of Comparative Economics, 34(1), 57-74. doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2005.11.001