Ownership, governance mechanisms, and agency costs in China's listed firms
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Journal of Asset Management
Publication Date
8-1-2008
Volume
9
Issue
2
First Page
90
Last Page
101
Keywords
agency costs, corporate governance
Abstract
Our study analyses the relations among agency costs, ownership structure, and governance mechanisms in Chinese listed firms. We find that firms with foreign shareholders incur higher agency costs. Legal person shareholders, our proxy for institutional investors, and government ownership have no impact on the level of agency costs. We also find that boards with a majority of outside directors are not associated with lower agency costs. There is some evidence that concentrated ownership is associated with lower agency costs. Although Chinese listed firms have engaged in ownership and governance reform, this has not manifested itself in a reduction in agency costs.
DOI
10.1057/jam.2008.13
Print ISSN
14708272
E-ISSN
1479179X
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2008 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Firth, M., Fung, P. M. Y., & Rui, O. M. (2008). Ownership, governance mechanisms, and agency costs in China's listed firms. Journal of Asset Management, 9(2), 90-101. doi: 10.1057/jam.2008.13