Perceptual indiscriminability : in defence of Wright's proof
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
The Philosophical Quarterly
Publication Date
7-1-2004
Volume
54
Issue
216
First Page
439
Last Page
444
Publisher
Oxford University Press
Abstract
A series of unnoticeably small changes in an observable property may add up to a noticeable change. Crispin Wright has used this fact to prove that perceptual indiscriminability is a non-transitive relation. Delia Graff has recently argued that there is a 'tension' between Wright's assumptions. But Graff has misunderstood one of these, that 'phenomenal continua' are possible; and the other, that our powers of discrimination are finite, is sound. If the first assumption is properly understood, it is not in tension with but is actually implied by the second, given a plausible physical assumption.
DOI
10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00364.x
Print ISSN
00318094
Publisher Statement
Copyright © The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
De Clercq, R., & Horsten, L. (2007). Perceptual indiscriminability: in defence of Wright's proof. The Philosophical Quarterly, 54(216), 439-444. doi: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00364.x