Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Economics Letters
Publication Date
10-2012
Volume
117
Issue
1
First Page
337
Last Page
339
Publisher
Elsevier BV
Keywords
Visibility; Incentive pay; Implicit regulation
Abstract
This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of corporate visibility based on the number of news stories about each firm in a balanced panel of 242 public companies.
DOI
10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044
Print ISSN
01651765
E-ISSN
18737374
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2012 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Rayton, B. A., Brammer, S., & Cheng, S. (2012). Corporate visibility and executive pay. Economics Letters, 117(1), 337-339. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.044