Date of Award
9-5-2024
Degree Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Philosophy (MPHIL)
Discipline
Arts
Department
Philosophy
First Advisor
Prof. BRADLEY Adam Lee
Second Advisor
Prof. HAWKE Peter Michael
Abstract
The problem of external world skepticism is typically understood as a paradox. It consists of three intuitive claims, which are incompatible if put together. The three claims are: (I) If we do not know that we are not in a skeptical scenario, then we do not know almost all ordinary perceptual propositions. (II) We do not know that we are not in a skeptical scenario. (III) We know almost all ordinary perceptual propositions.
In this thesis, I examine two responses to the skeptical paradox: transcendental arguments and hinge epistemology.
There are two types of transcendental arguments: ambitious transcendental arguments and modest transcendental arguments. In order to solve the skeptical paradox, ambitious transcendental arguments aim to reject (II). Following Stroud, I think ambitious transcendental arguments fail. Unlike ambitious transcendental arguments, modest transcendental arguments don’t attempt to reject (II). In Chapter 1, I will focus on a paradigmatic example of modest transcendental arguments, i.e., Stroud’s Davidsonian argument. Relying on a Davidsonian claim, Stroud aims to show that we cannot consider or entertain skeptical scenarios. As I shall argue, Stroud’s Davidsonian argument, if sound, can show that we cannot find ourselves confronted with the skeptical paradox. Nonetheless, I will argue that since there is no sufficient reason to think the Davidsonian claim is true, Stroud’s Davidsonian argument ultimately fails.
Hinge epistemology is a family of views inspired by a Wittgensteinian claim. I will examine three prominent versions of hinge epistemology from Wright, Coliva, and Pritchard. All three versions attempt to solve the skeptical paradox by rejecting (I).
Both Wright and Coliva argue that we have non-evidential epistemic justification to commit to hinge propositions. I will assume hinge propositions are propositions expressing that one is not in skeptical scenarios. Wright’s argument is widely thought to fail, mainly because it relies on a version of epistemic consequentialism, which is subject to the so-called “Truth Fairy” objection. I will pay more attention to Coliva’s argument. In Chapter 2, I will argue that Coliva’s argument for there being non-evidential epistemic justification to commit to hinge propositions fails. I will argue further that Coliva faces a dilemma: she either fails to show there being non-evidential epistemic justification to commit to hinge propositions or faces a variant of the Truth Fairy objection.
Pritchard argues that our commitment to hinge propositions is not knowledge-apt belief and not the result of a rational process; therefore, the epistemic closure principle is not applicable to hinge propositions. So, Pritchard argues that we can reject (I) while maintaining the epistemic closure principle. In Chapter 3, I will argue that Pritchard’s argument that our commitment to hinge propositions is not knowledge-apt belief fails. I will argue further that even if Pritchard successfully shows that our commitment to hinge propositions is not knowledge-apt belief, he still fails to show that the epistemic closure principle is not applicable to hinge propositions, so he fails to solve the skeptical paradox.
Language
English
Copyright
The copyright of this thesis is owned by its author. Any reproduction, adaptation, distribution or dissemination of this thesis without express authorization is strictly prohibited.
Recommended Citation
Sun, C. (2024). Responding to skepticism: From transcendental arguments to hinge epistemology (Master's thesis, Lingnan University, Hong Kong). Retrieved from https://commons.ln.edu.hk/otd/224/