Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Economics Letters

Publication Date

7-1-2011

Volume

112

Issue

1

First Page

128

Last Page

131

Publisher

Elsevier

Keywords

Markets with search frictions, matching and bargaining, two-sided incomplete information

Abstract

We consider a private information replica of the dynamic matching and bargaining model of Mortensen and Wright (2002). We find that private information typically deters entry. But, the welfare can actually be higher under private information.

DOI

10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016

Print ISSN

01651765

E-ISSN

18737374

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2011 Elsevier.

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Full-text Version

Accepted Author Manuscript

Recommended Citation

Shneyerov, A., & Wong, A. C. L. (2011). The role of private information in dynamic matching and bargaining: Can it be good for efficiency? Economics Letters, 112(1), 128-131. doi: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.03.016