Title

Ownership, governance mechanisms, and agency costs in China's listed firms

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Journal of Asset Management

Publication Date

8-1-2008

Volume

9

Issue

2

First Page

90

Last Page

101

Keywords

agency costs, corporate governance

Abstract

Our study analyses the relations among agency costs, ownership structure, and governance mechanisms in Chinese listed firms. We find that firms with foreign shareholders incur higher agency costs. Legal person shareholders, our proxy for institutional investors, and government ownership have no impact on the level of agency costs. We also find that boards with a majority of outside directors are not associated with lower agency costs. There is some evidence that concentrated ownership is associated with lower agency costs. Although Chinese listed firms have engaged in ownership and governance reform, this has not manifested itself in a reduction in agency costs.

DOI

10.1057/jam.2008.13

Print ISSN

14708272

E-ISSN

1479179X

Publisher Statement

Copyright © 2008 Palgrave Macmillan Ltd

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Firth, M., Fung, P. M. Y., & Rui, O. M. (2008). Ownership, governance mechanisms, and agency costs in China's listed firms. Journal of Asset Management, 9(2), 90-101. doi: 10.1057/jam.2008.13