Title

The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Studia Logica

Publication Date

10-1-2007

Volume

87

Issue

1

First Page

65

Last Page

71

Keywords

Dutch Book, degree of belief, coherence, probabolistic theories of rationality, subjective interpretation of probability

Abstract

It is a common view that the axioms of probability can be derived from the following assumptions: (a) probabilities reflect (rational) degrees of belief, (b) degrees of belief can be measured as betting quotients; and (c) a rational agent must select betting quotients that are coherent. In this paper, I argue that a consideration of reasonable betting behaviour, with respect to the alleged derivation of the first axiom of probability, suggests that (b) and (c) are incorrect. In particular, I show how a rational agent might assign a ‘probability’ of zero to an event which she is sure will occur.

DOI

10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2

Print ISSN

00393215

E-ISSN

15728730

Publisher Statement

Copyright © Springer 2007

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Additional Information

The same paper is presented at the 2006 Joint Session of the Aristotelian Society and the Mind Association, University of Southampton, Southampton, United Kingdom, July 2006.

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Recommended Citation

Rowbottom, D. P. (2007). The insufficiency of the Dutch Book argument. Studia Logica, 87(1), 65-71. doi: 10.1007/s11225-007-9077-2