Title

Perceptual indiscriminability : in defence of Wright's proof

Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

The Philosophical Quarterly

Publication Date

7-1-2004

Volume

54

Issue

216

First Page

439

Last Page

444

Abstract

A series of unnoticeably small changes in an observable property may add up to a noticeable change. Crispin Wright has used this fact to prove that perceptual indiscriminability is a non-transitive relation. Delia Graff has recently argued that there is a 'tension' between Wright's assumptions. But Graff has misunderstood one of these, that 'phenomenal continua' are possible; and the other, that our powers of discrimination are finite, is sound. If the first assumption is properly understood, it is not in tension with but is actually implied by the second, given a plausible physical assumption.

DOI

10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00364.x

Print ISSN

00318094

Publisher Statement

Copyright © The Philosophical Quarterly, 2004

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Recommended Citation

De Clercq, R., & Horsten, L. (2007). Perceptual indiscriminability: in defence of Wright's proof. The Philosophical Quarterly, 54(216), 439-444. doi: 10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00364.x