Licensing bargaining under non-discrimination
Organizer
Department of Economics, Lingnan University
Event Title
Document Type
Public Seminar
Date
11-19-2021
Time
14:30 - 16:00
Venue
WYL314
Department
Economics
Description
We consider how licensing bargaining would change under non-discrimination restrictions. For an owner of a patent that is essential to a technology standard (e.g. 5G and WIFI), the owner would have monopoly power since it is impossible to implement the standard without the technology. In particular, the owner could extract additional profits from the implementors through price discrimination. However, this market power was created only because the technology was chosen as part of the standard by the industries, among other competing technologies. To avoid such a holdup problem, patent holders are often required to commit to licensing without discrimination for their patents in order to be a part of a standard. We show that this nondiscriminatory restriction only works as expected in some situations and could lead to very undesirable outcomes in many other situations.
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Ko, C.-y. (2021, November 19). Licensing bargaining under non-discrimination [Video podcast]. Retrieved from https://commons.ln.edu.hk/videos/917/
Additional Information
Speaker Biography
Chiu-yu Ko obtained his BBA (Insurance, Financial and Actuarial Analysis) and MPhil (Economics) from The Chinese University of Hong Kong in 2005 and 2007. He received his PhD (Economics) from Boston College in 2012. Upon graduation, he joined the Department of Economics in the National University of Singapore as an assistant professor.
His research focuses on game theory, industrial organisation, and political economy. For game theory, he works on the bargaining, principal-agent, and resource allocation problems. For industrial organisation, he specialises in innovation and platform competition. For political economy, he is interested in political system and political history.
His research has been published/accepted in peer-reviewed journals including Canadian Journal of Economics, International Economic Review, Games and Economic Behavior, Journal of Economic Theory, Journal of Economic and Management Strategy, Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, and Theory and Decision.