How do alliances grow and conflicts ensure? An experiment on conflict network formation
Lingnan access only.
Due to technical issue, the seminar recording stops at around 56:07.
Department of Economics, Lingnan University
15:00 - 16:30
In a social network in which friendly and rival bilateral links can be formed, how do alliances between decision-makers form, and what determines whether a conflict will arise? We study a network formation game between ex-ante symmetric players in the laboratory to examine the dynamics of alliance formation and conflict evolution. A peaceful equilibrium yields the greatest social welfare, while a successful bullying attack transfers the victimized player’s resources evenly to the attackers at a cost. Consistently with the theoretical model predictions, peaceful and bullying outcomes are prevalent among the randomly re-matched experimental groups, based on the cost of attack. We further examine the dynamics leading to the final network and find that groups tend to coordinate quickly on a first target for attack, while the first attacker entails a non-negligible risk of successful counter-attack by initiating the coordination. These findings provide insights for understanding social dynamics in group coordination.
Lien, J. (2021, November 5). How do alliances grow and conflicts ensure? An experiment on conflict network formation [Video podcast]. Retrieved from https://commons.ln.edu.hk/videos/915/