Stable cartel with a cournot fringe in a symmetric oligopoly
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Keio Economic studies
Publication Date
10-1-1999
Volume
36
Issue
2
First Page
1
Last Page
10
Publisher
Keio Economic Society, Keio University
Keywords
Stable cartel, Stackelberg quantity leader, Cournot fringe
Abstract
We consider a symmetric cartel formation game where the cartel, once formed, acts as a Stackelberg quantity leader and the nonmember firms play the Cournot game with respect to the residual demand. We show the existence of a stable cartel under fairly general demand and cost conditions. We also compare by means of numerical examples the size of stable cartels in our model with that in the price leadership model of d'Aspremont et al.
Print ISSN
00229709
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 1999 Keio Economic Society.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Konishi, H., & Lin, P. (1999). Stable cartel with a cournot fringe in a symmetric oligopoly. Keio Economic studies, 36(2), 1-10. Retrieved from http://koara.lib.keio.ac.jp/xoonips/modules/xoonips/detail.php?koara_id=AA00260492-19990002-0001