The early reception of Bernard Williams’ reduplication argument (1956–62)
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie
Publication Date
8-2017
Volume
99
Issue
3
First Page
326
Last Page
345
Publisher
Walter de Gruyter GmbH
Abstract
The reduplication argument advanced by Bernard Williams in 1956 has greatly stimulated the contemporary debate on personal identity. The argument relies on a famous thought experiment that, although not new in the history of philosophy, has engaged some of the most influential contemporary philosophers on the topic. I propose here an interpretation of the argument and a reconstruction of the early reception that Williams’ paper had in the 6 years immediately after its publication. The works discussed include papers by C. B. Martin, G. C. Nerlich, R. Coburn, and J. M. Shorter.
DOI
10.1515/agph-2017-0015
Print ISSN
00039101
E-ISSN
16130650
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2017 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston. Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Sauchelli, A. (2017). The early reception of Bernard Williams’ reduplication argument (1956–62). Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie, 99(3), 326-345. doi: 10.1515/agph-2017-0015