Information manipulation and Climate Agreements
American Journal of Agricultural Economics
Oxford University Press
Asymmetric information, climate change, information transmission, international environmental agreements
It appears that news media and some pro-environmental organizations have the tendency to accentuate or even exaggerate the damage caused by climate change. This article provides a rationale for this tendency by using a modified International Environmental Agreement (IEA) model with asymmetric information. We find that the information manipulation has an instrumental value, as it ex post induces more countries to participate in an IEA, which will eventually enhance global welfare. From the ex ante perspective, however, the impact that manipulating information has on the level of participation in an IEA and on welfare is ambiguous.
Copyright © The Author (2014). Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the Agricultural and Applied Economics Association. All rights reserved.
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Hong, F., & Zhao, X. (2014). Information manipulation and Climate Agreements. American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 96(3), 851-861. doi: 10.1093/ajae/aau001