Can the incompatibilist get past the no past objection?
I refute Bailey's claim that his argument for incompatibilism is immune to Campbell's No Past Objection. In my refutation I stress a simple point, that nomological necessitation by future world states does not undermine one's freedom with respect to the present world state. My analysis reveals that the No Past Objection challenges van Inwagen's second consequence argument about as much as it does the others, and suggests that the (uncompromising) incompatibilist must pursue some of the options that Bailey regarded as costly in order to overcome the No Past Objection.
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Zhang, J. (2013). Can the incompatibilist get past the no past objection? Dialectica, 67(3), 345-352. doi: 10.1111/1746-8361.12024