The hard road to presentism
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Pacific Philosophical Quarterly
Publication Date
9-1-2014
Volume
95
Issue
3
First Page
314
Last Page
335
Abstract
It is a common criticism of presentism - the view according to which only the present exists - that it errs against truthmaker theory. Recent attempts to resolve the truthmaker objection against presentism proceed by restricting truthmaker maximalism (the view that all truths have truthmakers), maintaining that propositions concerning the past are not made true by anything, but are true nonetheless. Support for this view is typically garnered from the case for negative existential propositions, which some philosophers contend are exceptions to truthmaker maximalism. In this article, we argue that a 'no truthmakers' approach to the truthmaker objection is critically flawed.
DOI
10.1111/papq.12029
Print ISSN
02790750
E-ISSN
14680114
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2014 University of Southern California and John Wiley & Sons Ltd
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Asay, J., & Baron, S. (2014). The hard road to presentism. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 95(3), 314-335. doi: 10.1111/papq.12029