Oxford University Press
metaphilosophy, methodology, intuitions, science, epistemology, metaphysics, philosophy of mind, experimental philosophy
What are intuitions? Should we ever trust them? And if so, when? Do they have an indispensable role in science, e.g. in thought experiments, as well as in philosophy? Or should appeal to intuitions be abandoned altogether? This book brings together leading early- to late-career philosophers, to tackle such questions. It presents state-of-the-art thinking on the topic. The chapters in the first part of the book discuss the epistemological and metaphysical standing of intuitions; the chapters in the second part look at how intuitions are used in disciplines besides philosophy, and in sub-disciplines of philosophy; the chapters in the final part consider the challenges to intuitions-driven philosophy from experimental philosophy and contemporary analytic metaphysics.
Copyright © Oxford University Press 2014.
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Booth, A. R., & Rowbottom, D. P. (Eds.) (2014). Intuitions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. doi: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199609192.001.0001