Title
Ambivalent desires and the problem with reduction
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Philosophical Studies: An International Journal for Philosophy in the Analytic Tradition
Publication Date
8-1-2010
Volume
150
Issue
1
First Page
37
Last Page
47
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Keywords
Ambivalence, Desires, Preferences, Practical rationality, Humeanism, Decision theory
Abstract
Ambivalence is most naturally characterized as a case of conflicting desires. In most cases, an agent’s intrinsic desires conflict contingently: there is some possible world in which both desires would be satisfied. This paper argues, though, that there are cases in which intrinsic desires necessarily conflict—i.e., the desires are not jointly satisfiable in any possible world. Desiring a challenge for its own sake is a paradigm case of such a desire. Ambivalence of this sort in an agent’s desires creates special problems for the project of reducing all facts about an agent’s desires to facts about his or her preferences over options. If this reductive project fails, there is reason to suspect that the Decision Theory cannot give us a complete theory of Humean rationality.
DOI
10.1007/s11098-009-9396-4
Print ISSN
00318116
E-ISSN
15730883
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Baker, D. C. (2010). Ambivalent desires and the problem with reduction. Philosophical Studies, 150(1), 37-47. doi: 10.1007/s11098-009-9396-4
