Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals : Lewis vs. Williamson on modal knowledge
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Synthese
Publication Date
10-1-2010
Volume
176
Issue
3
First Page
345
Last Page
359
Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Keywords
Modal epistemology, Counterfactual thinking, Possible worlds, Modality
Abstract
The epistemology of modality is gradually coming to play a central role in general discussions about modality. This paper is a contribution in this direction, in particular I draw a comparison between Lewis’s Modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s recent account of modality in terms of counterfactual thinking. In order to have criteria of evaluation, I also formulate four requirements which are supposed to be met by any theory of modality to be epistemologically adequate.
DOI
10.1007/s11229-009-9571-3
Print ISSN
00397857
E-ISSN
15730964
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2009 Springer Science+Business Media B.V.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Sauchelli, A. (2010). Concrete possible worlds and counterfactual conditionals: Lewis vs. Williamson on modal knowledge. Synthese, 176(3), 345-359. doi: 10.1007/s11229-009-9571-3