Title
Ex ante vs. Ex post rationalization of action
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy
Publication Date
1-1-2006
Volume
9
First Page
137
Last Page
142
Abstract
This paper is part of an attempt to clarify the relationship between explanatory reasons and justificatory reasons for actions of various kinds. It draws on a distinction between two notions of rationalization, viz., ex ante and ex post rationalization, to recast the akratic case on the one hand and to explicate an adequate sense in which an explanatory but non-justificatory reason for an action rationalizes the latter on the other hand. The explication is helped by analysis of a hypothetical example, and the name "quasi-rational" is legitimated for the type of actions this example represents. Last, but not least, the paper demonstrates that an implication of the argument is the falsity of one well-known principle in Davidson's action theory, i.e., the principle claiming that the (primary) reason for an action is also its cause.
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Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Zheng, Y. (2006). Ex ante vs. Ex post rationalization of action.The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy, 9, 137-142.
