Title

Memes, mind, and normativity

Document Type

Book chapter

Source Publication

Culture, nature, memes

Publication Date

1-1-2008

First Page

191

Last Page

201

Publisher

Newcastle

Abstract

Prominent memeticists like Daniel Dennett and Susan Blackmore have made claims far more radical than those included in Dawkins’ original proposal, which provoked increasingly heated debates and arguments over the theoretical significance as well as limits or flaws of the entire memetic enterprise. In this paper, I examine closely some of the critical points taken by Kate Distin in her penetrating engagement with those radical claims, which include such ideas as the thought that we are meme machines as much as gene machines, the thesis that there is no conscious self inside those machines, and the claim that a complex interplay of replicators and environment is all there is to life (Blackmore 1999: 241). It is hoped that a viable thesis concerning a deep-seated normativity emerges from my discussion.

Publisher Statement

Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.

Additional Information

ISBN of the source publication: 9781847186638

Full-text Version

Publisher’s Version

Language

English

Recommended Citation

Zheng, Y. (2008). Memes, mind, and normativity. In Thorsten Botz-Bornstein (Ed.), Culture, nature, memes (pp. 191-201). Cambridge Scholars: Newcastle.

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