Guilt by statistical association : revisiting the prosecutor’s fallacy and the interrogator’s fallacy
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Journal of Philosophy
Publication Date
6-1-2008
Volume
105
Issue
6
First Page
320
Last Page
332
Publisher
Journal of Philosophy, Inc.
Abstract
The article focuses on prosecutor's fallacy and interrogator's fallacy, the two kinds of reasoning in inferring a suspect's guilt. The prosecutor's fallacy is a combination of two conditional probabilities that lead to unfortunate commission of error in the process due to the inclination of the prosecutor in the establishment of strong evidence that will indict the defendant. It provides a comprehensive discussion of Gerd Gigerenzer's discourse on a criminal case in Germany explaining the perils of prosecutor's fallacy in his application of probability to practical problems. It also discusses the interrogator's fallacy which was introduced by Robert A. J. Matthews as the error on the assumption that confessional evidence can never reduce the probability of guilt.
Print ISSN
0022362X
E-ISSN
19398549
Publisher Statement
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Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
De Macedo,C. (pseudonym of Neven, Sesardic). (2008). Guilt by statistical association: Revisiting the prosecutor’s fallacy and the interrogator’s fallacy. Journal of Philosophy, 105(6), 320-332.