Robot lies in health care : when is deception morally permissible?
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal
Publication Date
6-1-2015
Volume
25
Issue
2
First Page
169
Last Page
192
Abstract
Autonomous robots are increasingly interacting with users who have limited knowledge of robotics and are likely to have an erroneous mental model of the robot’s workings, capabilities, and internal structure. The robot’s real capabilities may diverge from this mental model to the extent that one might accuse the robot’s manufacturer of deceiving the user, especially in cases where the user naturally tends to ascribe exaggerated capabilities to the machine (e.g. conversational systems in elder-care contexts, or toy robots in child care). This poses the question, whether misleading or even actively deceiving the user of an autonomous artifact about the capabilities of the machine is morally bad and why. By analyzing trust, autonomy, and the erosion of trust in communicative acts as consequences of deceptive robot behavior, we formulate four criteria that must be fulfilled in order for robot deception to be morally permissible, and in some cases even morally indicated.
DOI
10.1353/ken.2015.0007
Print ISSN
10546863
E-ISSN
10863249
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2015 Johns Hopkins University Press.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Matthias, A. (2015). Robot lies in health care: When is deception morally permissible? Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 25(2), 169-192. doi: 10.1353/ken.2015.0007