Modal fictionalism, possible worlds, and artificiality
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Acta Analytica
Publication Date
12-2013
Volume
28
Issue
4
First Page
411
Last Page
421
Keywords
Modality; Fictionalism; Possible worlds; Modal fictionalism; Artificiality; Integration challenge
Abstract
Accounts of modality in terms of fictional possible worlds face an objection based on the idea that when modal claims are analysed in terms of fictions, the connection between analysans and analysandum seems artificial. Strong modal fictionalism, the theory according to which modal claims are analysed in terms of a fiction, has been defended by, among others, Seahwa Kim, who has recently claimed that the philosophical objection that the connection between modality and fictions is artificial can be met. I propose a new way of spelling out the intuition of artificiality and show that strong modal fictionalism should be rejected.
DOI
10.1007/s12136-013-0186-4
Print ISSN
03535150
E-ISSN
18746349
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2013 Springer.
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Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Sauchelli, A. (2013). Modal fictionalism, possible worlds, and artificiality. Acta Analytica, 28(4), 411-421. doi: 10.1007/s12136-013-0186-4