Title
Information sharing in a supply chain with a common retailer
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Management Science
Publication Date
1-2016
Volume
62
Issue
1
First Page
245
Last Page
263
Publisher
INFORMS
Keywords
supply chain management; common retailer; incentive; information sharing; nonlinear production cost; manufacturer competition
Abstract
We consider the problem of sharing retailer's demand information in a supply chain with two competing manufacturers selling substitutable products through a common retailer. We examine several scenarios with either the retailer or the manufacturers as leaders in offering information (sharing) contracts. We show that a larger production diseconomy or higher competition intensity induces more information sharing. The retailer may benefit from a larger production diseconomy, which is not possible without information contracting. Information contracting always benefits the retailer, and the benefit is larger when she offers contracts sequentially rather than simultaneously to the manufacturers. Information contracting benefits the manufacturers only when they offer the contracts and production diseconomy is large. When either demand uncertainty or production diseconomy is large, the retailer invests more in improving information accuracy. When competition is more intense, she invests more except under some conditions that we fully characterize.
DOI
10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
Print ISSN
00251909
E-ISSN
15265501
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2015 INFORMS.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Shang, W., Ha, A. Y., & Tong, S. (2015). Information sharing in a supply chain with a common retailer. Management Science, 62(1), 245-263. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.2014.2127
