Regulation and corporate corruption : new evidence from the telecom sector
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Journal of Comparative Economics
Publication Date
2-1-2012
Volume
40
Issue
1
First Page
22
Last Page
43
Publisher
Academic Press
Keywords
Telecommunications, Regulation, Corruption
Abstract
This paper examines how government regulation in developing countries affects the form of corruption between business customers and service providers in the telecom sector. We match the World Bank enterprise-level data on bribes with a unique cross-country telecom regulation dataset collected by Wallsten et al. (2004), finding that (1) strong regulatory substance (the content of regulation) and regulatory governance reduce corruption; (2) competition and privatization reduces corruption; (3) the effects of regulatory substance on corruption control are stronger in countries with state-owned or partially state-owned telecoms, greater competition, and higher telecommunication fees; and (4) bureaucratic quality exert substitution effects to regulatory substance in deterring corruption. Overall, our results suggest that regulatory strategies that reduce information asymmetry and increase accountability tend to reduce illegal side-payments for connections.
DOI
10.1016/j.jce.2011.12.001
Print ISSN
01475967
E-ISSN
10957227
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2011 Association for Comparative Economic Studies Published by Elsevier Inc.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Berg, S. V., Jiang, L., & Lin, C. (2012). Regulation and corporate corruption: New evidence from the telecom sector. Journal of Comparative Economics, 40(1), 22-43. doi: 10.1016/j.jce.2011.12.001