Document Type

Journal article

Source Publication

Mind

Publication Date

7-1-2014

Volume

123

Issue

491

First Page

753

Last Page

790

Abstract

Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons explain obligations and show that it solves this problem.

DOI

10.1093/mind/fzu085

Print ISSN

00264423

E-ISSN

14602113

Publisher Statement

Copyright © Nair 2014.

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Full-text Version

Accepted Author Manuscript

Recommended Citation

Nair, S. (2014). Consequences of reasoning with conflicting obligations. Mind, 123(491), 753-790. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzu085