Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Mind
Publication Date
7-1-2014
Volume
123
Issue
491
First Page
753
Last Page
790
Abstract
Since at least the 1960s, deontic logicians and ethicists have worried about whether there can be normative systems that allow conflicting obligations. Surprisingly, however, little direct attention has been paid to questions about how we may reason with conflicting obligations. In this paper, I present a problem for making sense of reasoning with conflicting obligations and argue that no deontic logic can solve this problem. I then develop an account of reasoning based on the popular idea in ethics that reasons explain obligations and show that it solves this problem.
DOI
10.1093/mind/fzu085
Print ISSN
00264423
E-ISSN
14602113
Publisher Statement
Copyright © Nair 2014.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Nair, S. (2014). Consequences of reasoning with conflicting obligations. Mind, 123(491), 753-790. doi: 10.1093/mind/fzu085