Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
Publication Date
9-2016
Volume
93
Issue
2
First Page
321
Last Page
347
Publisher
Wiley-Blackwell Publishing, Inc.
Abstract
This paper argues that, with certain provisos, predicting one's future actions is incompatible with rationally deliberating about whether to perform those actions. It follows that fully rational omniscient agents are impossible, since an omniscient being could never rationally deliberate about what to do (omniscient beings, the paper argues, will always meet the relevant provisos). Consequently, theories that explain practical reasons in terms of the choices of a perfectly rational omniscient agent must fail. The paper considers several ways of defending the possibility of an omniscient agent, and concludes that while some of these may work, they are inconsistent with the aim of explaining practical normativity by appeal to such an agent.
DOI
10.1111/phpr.12199
Print ISSN
00318205
E-ISSN
19331592
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2015 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, LLC.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Baker, D. (2015). Deliberators must be imperfect. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 93(2), 321-347. doi: 10.1111/phpr.12199