Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Ratio
Publication Date
3-2015
Volume
28
Issue
1
First Page
65
Last Page
80
Abstract
Joseph Raz and Sergio Tenenbaum argue that the Guise of the Good thesis explains both the possibility of practical reason and its unity with theoretical reason, something Humean psychological theories may be unable to do. This paper will argue, however, that Raz and Tenenbaum face a dilemma: either the version of the Guise of the Good they offer is too strong to allow for weakness of will, or it will lose its theoretical advantage in preserving the unity of reason.
DOI
10.1111/rati.12066
Print ISSN
00340006
E-ISSN
14679329
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2014 John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Accepted Author Manuscript
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Baker, D. (2015). Akrasia and the problem of the unity of reason. Ratio, 28(1), 65-80. doi: 10.1111/rati.12066