Information versus knowledge in confirmation theory
Document Type
Book chapter
Source Publication
Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop in the Philosophy of Information
Publication Date
1-1-2012
First Page
1
Last Page
10
Publisher
The Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts
Abstract
Darrell Rowbottom talked about the role of information and knowledge in the philosophy of Science on 18 November 2010 in the Third Workshop in the Philosophy of Information, Brussels, Belgium. Starting from the old definition of knowledge as justified true belief, Darrell defended the thesis that scientific progress is about useful information, rather than about knowledge.
Must we appeal to the notion of knowledge, in the subjective sense typically discussed by epistemologists, in the philosophy of science? Many scientific realists appear to think so, in so far as they assert that we can achieve knowledge of (and not merely true beliefs about) unobservable things, and of theories concerning them. As a natural result, perhaps, this has recently led Bird to suggest that scientific progress should be understood in terms of knowledge, rather than merely truth.
But I would instead suggest that making scientific progress consists in acquiring useful information. I will argue for this by pointing out the scientific importance of collecting information that (a) is not and will not ever be believed, (b) is false (as it may be on some views of information), and (c) is truly believed without being justifiably believed. I will also say something about the different ways that ‘useful’ may be understood, with special reference to the property of truth and its role in positions such as constructive empiricism and structural realism. My own view is that even fictions may be both useful and informative; and this gels nicely with some recent work, e.g. by Frigg, on scientific models.
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Rowbottom, D. (2012). Information versus knowledge in confirmation theory. In P. Allo & G. Primiero (Ed.), Proceedings of the 3rd Workshop in the Philosophy of Information (pp. 1-10). Brussels: The Royal Flemish Academy of Belgium for Science and the Arts.