Intersubjective corroboration
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A
Publication Date
3-1-2008
Volume
39
Issue
1
First Page
124
Last Page
132
Keywords
Corroboration, Confirmation, Bayesianism, Intersubjective probability, Karl Popper, Formal epistemology
Abstract
How are we to understand the use of probability in corroboration functions? Popper says logically, but does not show we could have access to, or even calculate, probability values in a logical sense. This makes the logical interpretation untenable, as Ramsey and van Fraassen have argued.
If corroboration functions only make sense when the probabilities employed therein are subjective, however, then what counts as impressive evidence for a theory might be a matter of convention, or even whim. So isn’t so-called ‘corroboration’ just a matter of psychology?
In this paper, I argue that we can go some way towards addressing this objection by adopting an intersubjective interpretation, of the form advocated by Gillies, with respect to corroboration. I show why intersubjective probabilities are preferable to subjective ones when it comes to decision making in science: why group decisions are liable to be superior to individual ones, given a number of plausible conditions. I then argue that intersubjective corroboration is preferable to intersubjective confirmation of a Bayesian variety, because there is greater opportunity for principled agreement concerning the factors involved in the former.
DOI
10.1016/j.shpsa.2007.11.010
Print ISSN
00393681
E-ISSN
18792510
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2008 Elsevier Ltd
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Rowbottom, D. P. (2008). Intersubjective corroboration. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A, 39(1), 124-132. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsa.2007.11.010