Evolutionary epistemology and the aim of science
Document Type
Journal article
Source Publication
Australasian Journal of Philosophy
Publication Date
6-1-2010
Volume
88
Issue
2
First Page
209
Last Page
225
Abstract
Both Popper and van Fraassen have used evolutionary analogies to defend their views on the aim of science, although these are diametrically opposed. By employing Price's equation in an illustrative capacity, this paper considers which view is better supported. It shows that even if our observations and experimental results are reliable, an evolutionary analogy fails to demonstrate why conjecture and refutation should result in: (1) the isolation of true theories; (2) successive generations of theories of increasing truth-likeness; (3) empirically adequate theories; or (4) successive generations of theories of increasing proximity to empirical adequacy. Furthermore, it illustrates that appeals to induction do not appear to help. It concludes that an evolutionary analogy is only sufficient to defend the notion that the aim of science is to isolate a particular class of false theories, namely those that are empirically inadequate.
DOI
10.1080/00048400903367866
Print ISSN
00048402
E-ISSN
14716828
Publisher Statement
Copyright © 2010 Australasian Association of Philosophy
Access to external full text or publisher's version may require subscription.
Full-text Version
Publisher’s Version
Language
English
Recommended Citation
Rowbottom, D. P. (2010). Evolutionary epistemology and the aim of science. Australasian Journal of Philosophy, 88(2), 209-225. doi: 10.1080/00048400903367866